Berkouwer notes “Scripture doesn’t talk about man in the abstract, but man in his relation to God” (195).
Biblical use of the word “soul.”
Sometimes it is “nefesh,” meaning life and can refer to man himself. Berkouwer rejects that “soul” is a “localized religious part of man” (201). The Bible’s interchangeable usage between soul and life should draw attention to the fact that the “heart” is of primary importance: “The heart shows forth the deeper aspect of the whole humanness of man, not some functional localization in a part of man which would be the most important part” (202-203).
Concerning anthropological dualisms
Such a view sees the soul as the “higher” part, closer to God. Leads to ascetism. However, evil in the bible is never localized in a part of man.
Bavinck attacks trichotomy because Scripture knows of no original dualism between spirit and matter (209). The trichotomist sees the soul as mediating between body and spirit (find Damascene’s comment that the soul is higher point, cf Bruce McCormack, Engaging the Doctrine of God).
Dualism and duality are not identical (211). We can speak of a duality in God’s creation man and woman, without positing an ontological dualism between them (this is where Maximus and Jakob Boehme err). “Duality within created reality does not exclude harmony and unity, but is exactly oriented towards it” (211).
Does soul and body involve a tension, and if so that would make it a dualism? If it does involve a tension, we must reject not only trichotomy, but dichotomy.
Per the confessions and creeds, “there is a great difference between non-scientific references to a dual aspect of human nature and a thesis that man is composed of two substances, body and soul” (213-214).
They oppose the idea that all the rich variation of humanness can be forced into two substantial categories.
Hendrik Gerhardus Stoker defines substance as the “systatic core of man, that which functions in all spheres” (H.G. Stoker, Die nuwere Wijsbegeerte aan die Vrije Universiteit, 1933, 40ff.).
For the Dooyeweerdian critique, matter can never be an independent counter-pole to form.
Immortality of the Soul
Genuine and real life in Scripture is life in communion with God. The philosophical notion of “immortality of the soul” calls death a lie and misunderstands the judgment of God (250).
The main contention of Vollenhoven and Dooyeweerd whether there was a natural immortality based on an essence abstracted from its relation to God, from which we can draw further conclusions, such as the soul’s “indestructibility” (249).
Per Van der Leuw, there is no continued existence of the soul as such after death, “but a continuation of the contact point by God even though death” (Onsterfelijkheid of Opstanding, 25 quoted in Berkouwer 252).
- The problem of what happens when we die does not involve a purely spiritual salvation but can only be answered in the context of death and the Day of Judgment (Althaus).
Is immortality of the soul correlative with the substantial dualism of mind-body? This dichotomy raises substantial (pun?) problems and questions (255):
- When the “soul” is separated from the body, what activities is it still able to carry out?
- If the body is the organ of the soul (as in Aquinas), and the soul needs the body to carry out its functions, how can the soul know or do anything after death?
- Dooyeweerd notes that the psychic functions are indissolubly connected with the total temporal-cosmic relationship of all modal functions and cannot be abstracted from this relationship.
- Thus, we have a “living soul” which does not live.
- Rather, with Dooyeweerd we should speak of a duality which is supra-temporal in the religious center of man (heart) and the whole temporal-functional complex.
- Dooyeweerd does say that the soul continues as a form of existence with an individuality structure (Berkouwer 257n. 33).
Does Dooyeweerd’s school give us a “psychology without a soul?”
- No, for Dooyeweerd says we cannot view man’s essence “in itself” and then tack it onto a relation with God.