Great comments on the Vincentian Canon.
Decent section on the identity of God. Gives the standard arguments against liberal Protestantism (See Feuerbach) and shows Barth’s own limitations. Pannenberg has since been surpassed by his student Robert Jenson on the identity of God (i.e., the Guy that got us out of Egypt and raised Jesus from the dead).
Natural theology: does a good job in carrying the discussion back to pre-Christ Roman theorists, all of which highlights the various strands of natural theology. I have no problem with a natural theology of sorts, provided we understand that the term is by no means universally understood as meaning the same thing (of course, which sort of defeats the purpose of modern natural theologies). Pannenberg points out that older divines, both Protestant and Catholic, saw natural theology as meaning “in accord with the nature of God” and the God-world relation (81). Now it means in accord with the nature of the world.
Natural knowledge of God: He is not entirely clear. WP hovers around Romans 1:20 and suggests something like “infinity” as the natural knowledge of God. He develops this thought more in Metaphysik und Gottesgedank.
Revelation: WP tries to steer between the Barthian claim that God reveals himself as revelation and other claims. Eventually settles on the claim that revelation is the announcement and event of the future in the first coming of Jesus. I have no problem with that–I think there is some truth to it; I just don’t see how that is more plausible than some of the views WP criticizes as “implausible.”
The God of Jesus and the Trinity: The Spirit is the presence of mediation between the Kyrios and God the Father. WP notes the very close similarity (yet not identity) of pneuma and Kyrios (drawing heavily on 1 Cor. 15:45 and 2 Cor. 3:17):
The Kyrios is the risen and exalted Jesus whose return the community awaits. The Spirit is the form and power of his presence and of the relation of believers to him (I: 269)
Interestingly, WP notes that early Christian reflection on the Trinity (though they didn’t call it that) was not dissimilar from late Jewish reflection on God’s transcendence and immanence (277).
Pace the Cappadocians:
Basil distinguished between the fact that the deity is without oriign and the fact that the Father is unbegotten in distinction from the Son, who is begotten, but he did not go so far as Athanasius, who applied the relational conditioning of personal distinction, as mutual conditioning, to the Father as well, so that the Father can be thought of as unbegotten only in relation to the Son. The idea of the Father as the source and origin of deity so fused the the person of the Father and the substance of the Godhead that the divine substance is originally proper to the Father alone, being recieved from him by the Son and Spirit. In distinction from Athanasius this means a relapse into subordinationism, since the idea of mutual defining of the distinctiveness of the persons does not lead to the thought of an equally mutual ontological constitution, of which it can be said that strictly they are constitutive only for the personhood of the Son and the Spirit if the Father is the source and origin of deity (280).
Distinction and Unity of the Persons: The Son is posited as a self-distinction from the Father (310-311). Fine, but I don’t see how this is different from Athanasius. And then, one wonders how stable is Athanasius’s argument.
On another note, WP advances the argument that the self-distinction of the Son is not merely in his being begotten, but in his “handing over the kingdom to the Father.” This doesn’t solve all of the problems but it is a superior move in that it roots the Trinitarian movement in eschatology.
WP raises a point I’ve always wondered: can we honestly speak of mutual self-distinction of the three persons if no distinction is made between subject and object in God (320 n. 184)?
“The monarchy of the Father is not the presupposition but the result of the common operations” (325).