Chrysostom on Imputed Guilt

From Farrell’s God, History, and Dialectic.

But for Chrysostom, and indeed for all of the fathers and ecclesiastical writers of First Europe, salvation is tied to the total humanity of Christ, from his seedless and virginal conception to his Crucifixion, Ascension, Heavenly Intercession, and Second Coming. It is this “recapitulationalist” view of the Economy of Salvation and its “physicalism” that therefore distinguishes the exposition of St John Chrysostom on the doctrine of ancestral sin

(GHD, 187)

Chrysostom places “justification by faith” as an opposite of “death and sin.” For Chrysostom death includes the separation of body and soul. It is not merely legal or mentalist, but physical. When Chrysostom turns to the economy of salvation, he deals with what Adam and Eve’s progeny inherit from them as a result of their sin. He answers,

How then did death come to prevail? ‘Through the sin of one.’ But what means (the last phrase of Romans 5:12) ‘for all that have sinned?’ This: he having once fallen, even they that had not eaten from the tree, did from him, all of them, become mortal.”

Second Europe had subtley reinterpreted Genesis’s “in the day you shall eat of it you shall surely die” to mean “in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die and your progeny shall inherit your guilt and be culpable for it.”

(GHD, 188)

Romans 5:13 states that “until the law sin was in the world, but sin is not imputed where there is no law.”

Chrysostom denies that this passage means “before the giving of the Table at Sinai.” He asks, “How does one explain the presence of death if death is the reward of sins imputed by the Law given at Sinai?:

The phrase “till the Law” some think he used of the time before the giving of the Law— that of Abel, for instance, or of Noah, or of Abraham— till Moses was born. What was the sin in those days, at this rate? Some say he means that in Paradise. For hitherto it was not done away, (he would say,) but the fruit of it was yet in vigor. For it had borne that death whereof all partake, which prevailed and lorded over us. Why then does he proceed, “But sin is not imputed when there is no law?” It was by way of objection from the Jews, say they who have spoken on our side, that he laid this position down and said, if there be no sin without the Law, how came death to consume all those before the Law? But to me it seems that the sense presently to be given has more to be said for it, and suits better with the Apostle’s meaning. And what sense is this? In saying, that “till the Law sin was in the world,” what he seems to me to mean is this, that after the Law was given the sin resulting from the transgression of it prevailed, and prevailed too so long as the Law existed. For sin, he says, can have no existence if there be no law. If then it was this sin, he means, from the transgression of the Law that brought forth death, how was it that all before the Law died? For if it is in sin that death has its origin, but when there is no law, sin is not imputed, how came death to prevail? From whence it is clear, that it was not this sin, the transgression, that is, of the Law, but that of Adam’s disobedience, which marred all things. Now what is the proof of this? The fact that even before the Law all died: for “death reigned,” he says, “from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned.


Chrysostom’s portrayal of the relationship between sin and death is the reverse of the order in which second Europe portrayed it: death is the cause of sinful actions of those born after Adam and Eve, and even if one were sinless personally, one would still be subject to the law of death, the literal “falling apart” of one’s nature, that resulted as an affect on that nature of Adam and Eve’s sin. The guilt and culpability of their sin was not imputed to their posterity, but the corrupting consequence to human nature was transmitted. Death was both physically and morally corrupting to human nature, since the soul and body were designed in their natural state to be together.

GHD, 189)

Review of Hilary of Poitiers

Taken from NPNF (Second Series) vol 9.

In reviewing St Hilary’s thought, I will be relying primarily on Geofrey Bromiley’s Historical Theology for clarification on more difficult points.    In no way can Hilary’s work be considered a literary masterpiece.  It is about one hundred pages too long, repetitive, and wordy.  To be fair, he wrote much of it in exile and like Augustine, was not always privy to the more mature Eastern thinking (though Hilary rectified this in some ways).

Hilary begins his theology with God’s revelation.  We know God as he reveals himself to us.  However, our theologizing about God will always be opaque.  God is invisible, ineffable, etc., and the mind grows weary trying to comprehend him (ii.6).  Language itself fails us as words are powerless (ii.7).   Analogies offer some help but they only hint at the meaning (i.19).

Trinitarian theology for the church begins with the baptismal formula in St Matthew’s gospel.  The Father is the origin of all; the Son is the only-begotten, and the Spirit is the gift (ii.1).    As the source of all the Father has being in himself.   The fullness of the Father is in the Son.   Because the Son is of the Father’s nature, the Son has the Father’s nature.  Hilary’s point is that like nature begats like nature.

In a break with pagan thought, Hilary distinguishes between person and nature:  “nor are there two Gods but one from one” (ii.11).

Hilary and the Spirit

Did Hilary teach the Filioque?  It’s hard to tell, and neither camp should draw hard conclusions.  The facts are these:  1) in ii.29 the Schaff edition reads “we are bound to confess him, proceeding as He does, from Father and Son.”  However, the foonote points out that there are alternative, more probably readings.  It is acknowledged that throughout Hilary’s work the text has been corrupted at parts.   Even asssuming the present reading to be the correct one, one must ask if by procession Hilary would mean the same thing as later Filioquist writers?  The Latin word for proceed (procedere) does not have the same range as the multiple Greek words for “proceed.”  Roman Catholic scholar Jean Miguel Garrigues notes that one simply can’t read English translations of the Latin semantic domains of “proceed” and from that infer, quite simplisticly, that Hilary believed in the Filioque (L’Esprit qui dit «Père!» (Paris 1981), pp. 65-75.; [no, I don’t read French.  I found a link to this book on Perry’s blog, attendant with the relevant discussions).

2) Hilary goes on elsewhere to affirm that the Spirit is from the Father alone (viii.20) and the Father through the Son (xii.57); neither of these texts, obviously, are hard Filioquist reads, and in any case, this wasn’t Hilary’s point.

Evaluation

As an anti-Arian text, there is a reason why the Church spends more time with St Athanasius, Ambrose, and the Cappadocians.  The Cappadocians and St Ambrose would later refine Hilary’s argument.

On the other hand, Hilary provides the late Western reader with a number of valuable and often stunning insights to the nature of the Church, philosophy, and the evaluations of post-Reformation traditions.

The Eucharist: St Hilary draws an analogy between the “of one nature” with Father and Son and the utter reality of the Son in the Eucharist.  We receive the very Word make flesh in the Eucharist, not due to an agreement of will but because the Son took man’s nature to himself.

Denies monergism: Hilary denies there is a necessity on our will because that would impose faith on us (viii.12).

We know God by his operations or powers (later theologians would say energies):  God’s self-revelation displays his Name (Person).  This revelas his nature (i.27).   This is what Dr Joseph Farrell calls the ordo theologiae:  persons, operations, essence.  The persons do things and this reveals their essence.  In de Synodis para 69 Hilary warns that we must not start with the consubstantiality (or essence) when we do our Trinitarian reasoning, for this leads to confusion since the terms are not yet defined.  Rather, we must begin with the Persons.  (Critics of de Regnon be confounded!   Hilary clearly understands the importance of starting with the Persons, not the nature).

Rejects philosophical nominalism:  names correspond to realities (ix.69).  Therefore, are we justified in saying something is true of the Person of Christ that is not true of the taxonomy?  I admit:  this isn’t Hilary’s debate, since he hadn’t yet dealt with the Calvinist take on the extra Calvinisticum.  Hilary says “We must not divide Jesus Christ, for the Word was made flesh” (x.60-62).   Was there an “extra” to the divine nature outside the person of Christ?  Hilary doesn’t think so.

Prays to Saints:  “Be with me now in thy faithful spirit, holy and blessed Patriarch Jacob, to combat the poisonous hissings of the serpent of unbelief” (v.19).

On the Rock of Matthew 16.19ff:  “This faith it is which is the foundation of the Church; through this faith the gates of hell cannot prevail against her” (vi. 37).  The faith of the apostles, not the see of Peter, is the foundation of the Church.

Conclusion

It is not a literary masterpiece, nor is it really an outstanding apologia against Arianism.  However, it is a faithful reflection of the Tradition passed down, and it does give many remarkable “snapshots” of the Church’s belief which can inform, challenge, and hopefully change the minds of folk today.

 

 

 

Was DeRegnon Debunked?

If you read enough of modern, intra-community Trinitarian (no pun intended) debates, you can anticipate a lot of moves.  One particular line of thinking, advanced by de Regnon a century ago, is that the West begins from the impersonal divine essence and then reasons to the three Persons, while the East begins with the Persons and then reasons to the essence.

A number of modern scholars have claimed to debunk that thesis, though.  They say that 1) even Eastern theologians began from the unity of the divine essence and 2) such a view is impossible to prove anyway.

My thoughts:  I wonder how many people have actually read de Regnon.  Even if his work has been translated from the French to English, I doubt it’s still in print.  I think people are quoting tertiary sources in saying de Regnon is debunked.

Is it true?  Do Westerners start from the divine essence and Easterners from the persons?  Well, kind of.  On one hand, and I speak as an Easterner, there is no problem starting from the unity of the divine essence, per se.  Papadakis does precisely that (Crisis in Byzantium).   Since we hold to equal ultimacy of essence and persons, it is not a problem to start from either.  That being said, the question is not where one begins one’s theological method, but to the primacy of it.  For example, St John of Damascus can talk about the unity of the divine essence (is there an Orthodox theologian who actually disagrees with that?), and note one power, one energy, one will (again, standard Christology), and from that one may not conclude that Damascene is a Thomist after all.

There is a difference in method in starting from the essence and then speaking about the persons, against reasoning from the essence to the persons, the former qualifying the latter.  That is what Lossky et al are saying.

Enough with all of that.  At the end of the day the West does prioritize the essence and it wasn’t de Regnon who came up with that.  St Augustine does precisely that in De Trinitate.  Has anyone read Western takes on St Augustine?  These essays are often very “essency.”  I really don’t know what to say at this point.  These guys in some way do give primacy to the essence.

And to sort of prove my point, look at the Carolignian Shield.

 

Quit Hating on Hegel

I do not defend Hegel, but rather see how thorough the dialectic has permeated our way of thinking.  My Evangelical friends do not see this.  I was staggered the other day by this insight from Farrell,

For once the Trinity was dialectically formulated, it was only a matter of time before someone made the deduction that if God be a dialectical Trinity and the Sovereign Lord of History, then the key to the historical process must be revealed in the dialectical process at work within the Trinity itself.  Once these dialectical processes were loosed in (or perhaps upon) historiography, it was not long before the category errors and confusions implicit in Augustine’s Trinitarian formulation–the confusion and identification of hte persons with natural operations and with nature–were applied to law, politics, science, ethics, in short, to areas of social and intellectual organization that, at first glance,  seem to have little connection to something so “irrelevant” as theology and so obscure as the  filioque or the Augustinian ordo theologiae

GHD, 461

The Dialectic of US Federalism

This is taken from Joseph Farrell’s God History and Dialectic.  I found this on googlebooks.

In other words, the American federal constitution of 1789m as originally conceived and without the massive modifications which occurred after 1865 and 1913, was a brilliant adaptation of the original Augustinian dialectical scheme, giving a concrete mechanism of State, and founding it upon the new manifestation of the Chameleon godhead: the People

(Legislative is not Executive/Judicial
Judicial is not Executive/Legislative                                                                                                                               yet, all =  THE PEOPLE
Executive is not/Legislative/judicial

And lest it be misconstrued, the “People” here embodied a unique synthesis of the nationalist and internationalist understandings of fraternity, for all national, ethnic, and religious heritages could, in theory, be “American,” because what defined the “People” in America’s case was something negative: the mutual recognition of the moral sovereignty and the sanction of the individual person within the local sovereign state, a sanction not mediated by any intervening political instrument or agency, including any specific religion.  Like Leibniz’s monads, the “person” in this sense became a legal entity unto himself.  The solution to the long legal dilemmas posed by the development of law within the Second Europe which this arrangement embodied was therefore both brilliant and breathtaking.

But there was (and is) an inherent problem which this arrangement poses, a problem that can best be illuminated by stating it in the terms of St Gregory Nazianzus:  what is the relation of origin , if any, between the People and the mutually opposed organs of federal government? If there be none, then those relationships reduce to merely dialectical oppositions, a problem first posed by the Anti-Federalists.

The essence of the Anti-Federalist critique of the 1789 constitution  then, was that it tended, if one may so put it, to collapse, through the multiplication of governmental agencies and the relations of oppositions that distinguish them, either into perpetual anarchy on the one hand, or into an eventual amalgamation of all powers of government into a new and superintending form of tyrannical simplicity.

The particular focus of their critique was on the fact that the supreme court had no direct connection to the People from whom it supposedly derived its authority, bur rather that it was a abody whom they could influence only mediately, via the hypostasized executive and legislative relations of opposition within the government.  The parallel to the place of the holy Spirit within the Augustinian Trinity is intriguing, for there to the dialectical construction served only to divorce the Spirit from the Father by making the Son a mediating step in the dialectical process between the two.  The Anti-Federalists feared what has since become a reality, that once in place the Court would begin not only to review cases and act on legal precedent, but actually to create law out of flimsy legal materials in a judicial activism that sought not to adhere to the strict construction of the law, but which sought to embody changing moods and political trends in its decisions. The parallel to the change in ecclesiastical law of the status to the Papacy is obvious.  In short, the Court would become, on their view, a virtual second legislative body, not subject to any checks and balances.  Conversely, the Federal government, which takes on the increasingly menacing aspects of tyranny, also takes on the increasingly menacing aspects of anarchy, as the several departments of the executive and legislative branches of “government” not only multiply like rabbits, but multiply increasingly contradictory regulations and edicts, squeezing and molding “The People” into ever more restricted fields of liberty.

GHD: 702-704

Did Black Magic Destroy Serbia?

No, I don’t think Merlin cast a spell to that affect. (While it’s fairly certain that Merlin is a real character, I doubt he would do black magic against Christians).   For a year I’ve been reading and thinking about Joseph Farrell’s corpus.  I’m not entirely sure how much I buy his whole “cosmic war” theory, and whether he is right or wrong about “deep physics,” I do not have the intelligence to judge that situation.

I do know something about economics, though, being schooled (though firmly rejecting) in the Misesian tradition.  I’m currently reading Babylon’s Banksters.  Any reservations I have about the book deal with the chapters on deep physics.  Farrell’s reading of the economic situation, while innovative, appears to be sound.

Farrell summarizes his earlier books in a few pages in this book.  While my problems with the “cosmic war” thesis deal with my inability to harmonize it with the biblical narrative on early man (sorry, I won’t budge on this issue), I do accept that Farrell is on to something very important.

He makes the argument that an international banking cartel has existed for hundreds (perhaps thousands) of years.  There is a religious dimension to this cartel, though there endgame is primarily money and power.  The Federal Reserve is only the most recent manifestation of this cartel.

In some circles I’m known as an ardent defender of Serbia, and that’s true enough.   I do grant that Arkan and Milosevic are guilty of war crimes (same as NATO); nor was Serbia as “holy” as many made her out to be.  That said, one can often identify oneself accurately enough by one’s enemies.  While ultimately I ascribe spiritual and theological causes to major events in history, I do realize that the saying “follow the money” is accurate on one level.  What did the Anglo-American establishment stand to gain on removing the social nationalist government of Serbia?

Fr Raphael has given a good summary of the goals of the New World Order on Serbia.  The West knew if it could get a pipeline running from central asia into Europe, it could bypass Russia and be set for its energy needs.  Serbia, sitting in a natural transit route, seemed the best location.  Problem being, Serbia was a Social Nationalist state and for all of Milosevic’s evils, he opposed global capitalism and the New World Order.   Therefore, the NWO had to do several things:  1) secure the oil transit, 2) destroy a strong Social Nationalism regime, and 3) prove to the world that it could bypass international law and depose leaders at will.

While I say that Black Magic destroyed Serbia, I don’t want to overmystify the reality.  Black magic is tied to fiat money, reserve banking, and the creation of wealth from nothing.  I do believe there are sinister religious dimensions to the New World Order; I just don’t want to use that as a hypothesis yet.

Review of Babylon’s Banksters

While the specific details often border into the esoteric realm, Farrell’s broader conclusions are sound. Further, Farrell has done the painstaking work of detailing the connections between money, religion, and power. Indeed, the old adage “Follow the Money” rings true here. Farrell’s thesis on its simplest level is that there has been a secret international money cabal who has always been close to power. Farrell points out that ancient societies almost always saw a nexus involving the Temple, the Throne, and the Bullion. Further, the control of the bullion was often delegated to mercenary bands (The Bershee mines in ancient Egypt, for example)–thus further pointing to international dealings. Granted, in ancient times it was much cruder and not nearly as heinous and perfected as it is today.

Farrell begins his story with Li’s formula, pointing to the Chinese statitician who supposedly started the economic meltdown a few years ago. The formula doesn’t make sense to my understanding–but neither does the reasoning of those in power, so it’s probably an accurate description. There are two ways to view currency: a debt note or a real symbol of wealth. Strong countries had strong currencies (no, not the gold standard). The currency they issued–state currency–represented the real wealth of a nation. The currency issued by private groups is rather a facsimile of a facsmile. It does not represent real wealth, but only debt.

At this point Farrell begins his discussion of ancient physics. While I’m not competent to discuss what’s going on, there is one aspect that is relevant to his thesis: if you are going to have wealth independent of the banksters, you must have an energy source/defense to guarantee your survival. Enter Nikola Tesla. Tesla had actually found a way to provide limitless energy to the world, using the earth as the physical medium. And if the parallels between his project and the Tuskunga event are true, he was also able to weaponize it. J. P. Morgan, being a priest of the Banksters, found a way to discredit and impoverish Tesla. Tesla had challenged the banksters and paid for it.

This also explains Nazi Germany’s desire for energy. The Nazis, for all their evils, found a way to do an end-run around the Rockefeller/Rothschild banking cartel. With the Nazi fall, many SS officers emigrated to South America. Assuming that the Nazis did have weapons and physics beyond regular imagination, the Rockefellers saw several potentials: 1) The Rockefeller/Rothschilds, likely being the spiritual descendants of Nimrod and no doubt having deep Masonic and occultic roots, coveted that technology (and the money behind it). The Nazis had no way (and no point) of using that technology, nor did they want to give it to their enemies. 2) However, they did need an outlet for their money and the Rockefellers needed the interest that the Nazi billions would accrue in the banks.

Therefore, the Nazis and the Rockefellers reached a detente. Further, David Rockefeller intuited that a global government would give the banksters easier access to the physics they sought. Thus, the founding of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Bilderbergs (a Nazi actually started the Bilderbergs, a group that regularly sees Republican and Democrat participation).

That’s the general heart of the book. He says a lot more on the deep physics aspect. I simply do not have the expertise to judge his remarks. However, I now understand how *he* thinks the Giza Pyramids functioned as weapons. Normally radio (and energy) waves move in an “S” pattern (think of two people holding a jump rope and one popping it up/down). When this happens, the majority of the energy/power/??? is lost in the air. Tesla, however, in using the *earth* as the physical medium found a much powerful and clear way to send waves (think of two people holding a yard stick instead of a jump rope. The majority of the energy is still there upon reception). Tesla’s experiment grasped deep beneath the earth and, if the accounts are to be believed, likely caused the Tuskunga event. Therefore, while he may not be correct on the Pyramids, it is now easy to see Farrell’s point that the Pyramids could have functioned as such.

Interestingly, and while Farrell mentions this he does not develop it, Russia is one of the nations that is 1) actively opposed to the Rockefeller/Rothschild banking cartels and 2) currently pursuing alternative energy research.  Of course, this ties in nicely with what I (and others) have been saying about Russia’s opposition to the New World Order.

Chrysostom on Romans 5:13

From Farrell’s God, History, and Dialectic.

But for Chrysostom, and indeed for all of the fathers and ecclesiastical writers of First Europe, salvation is tied to the total humanity of Christ, from his seedless and virginal conception to his Crucifixion, Ascension, Heavenly Intercession, and Second Coming. It is this “recapitulationalist” view of the Economy of Salvation and its “physicalism” that therefore distinguishes the exposition of St John Chrysostom on the doctrine of ancestral sin

(GHD, 187)

Chrysostom places “justification by faith” as an opposite of “death and sin.” For Chrysostom death includes the separation of body and soul. It is not merely legal or mentalist, but physical. When Chrysostom turns to the economy of salvation, he deals with what Adam and Eve’s progeny inherit from them as a result of their sin. He answers,

How then did death come to prevail? ‘Through the sin of one.’ But what means (the last phrase of Romans 5:12) ‘for all that have sinned?’ This: he having once fallen, even they that had not eaten from the tree, did from him, all of them, become mortal.”

Second Europe had subtley reinterpreted Genesis’s “in the day you shall eat of it you shall surely die” to mean “in the day that you eat of it you shall surely die and your progeny shall inherit your guilt and be culpable for it.”

(GHD, 188)

Romans 5:13 states that “until the law sin was in the world, but sin is not imputed where there is no law.”

Chrysostom denies that this passage means “before the giving of the Table at Sinai.” He asks, “How does one explain the presence of death if death is the reward of sins imputed by the Law given at Sinai?:

The phrase till the Law some think he used of the time before the giving of the Law— that of Abel, for instance, or of Noah, or of Abraham— till Moses was born. What was the sin in those days, at this rate? Some say he means that in Paradise. For hitherto it was not done away, (he would say,) but the fruit of it was yet in vigor. For it had borne that death whereof all partake, which prevailed and lorded over us. Why then does he proceed, But sin is not imputed when there is no law? It was by way of objection from the Jews, say they who have spoken on our side, that he laid this position down and said, if there be no sin without the Law, how came death to consume all those before the Law? But to me it seems that the sense presently to be given has more to be said for it, and suits better with the Apostle’s meaning. And what sense is this? In saying, that till the Law sin was in the world, what he seems to me to mean is this, that after the Law was given the sin resulting from the transgression of it prevailed, and prevailed too so long as the Law existed. For sin, he says, can have no existence if there be no law. If then it was this sin, he means, from the transgression of the Law that brought forth death, how was it that all before the Law died? For if it is in sin that death has its origin, but when there is no law, sin is not imputed, how came death to prevail? From whence it is clear, that it was not this sin, the transgression, that is, of the Law, but that of Adam’s disobedience, which marred all things. Now what is the proof of this? The fact that even before the Law all died: for death reigned, he says, from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned.


Chrysostom’s portrayal of the relationship between sin and death is the reverse of the order in which second Europe portrayed it: death is the cause of sinful actions of those born after Adam and Eve, and even if one were sinless personally, one would still be subject to the law of death, the literal “falling apart” of one’s nature, that resulted as an affect on that nature of Adam and Eve’s sin. The guilt and culpability of their sin was not imputed to their posterity, but the corrupting consequence to human nature was transmitted. Death was both physically and morally corrupting to human nature, since the soul and body were designed in their natural state to be together.

GHD, 189)

More notes from Bathellos’s Byzantine Christ

The Notion of Will in Saint Maximus

Thelesis–basic term for “will.” Extremely loaded lexical background.
Gnome and proaerisis–a mode of willing bringing to mind sinful and post-lapsarian man.
Maximus makes the important distinction between willing and “mode of willing.” We can take the distinction even further to see the capacity of willing and the object of willing (119).
The “mode of willing” is the particular way in which a will is actualized.
More on Proaerisis–closely linked to the English words “choice” and “decision.” Gnome is a disposition of the appetite: Maximus uses these words to refer to the sinful state. Maximus excludes these modes of willing from Christ firstly, because it would introduce a human person in Christ. Why? While will is a faculty of nature, natures qua natures do not will. Persons do. If Christ had a deliberative will per gnome, and this was part of his human nature, he would now have a human person as well as a divine person (152). Further, as Joseph Farrell notes, gnome is a sub-category of “the mode of willing,” it is not identical with the mode of willing. Excluding the former does not negate the latter.
The Willing of the Saints in Heaven
Can saints have free-will in heaven? Sort of. Obviously, they will not sin, but neither will they be robots. How? The wills of the saints in heaven will be one according to the logos of nature, but varied insofar as the mode of movement of the wills is concerned, for each saint will participate in God in a manner proportionate to his desire (157; Farrell also scores huge points on this, Free Choice in St. Maximus the Confessor, 124).

Beginning Notes on Christology and Triadology

I plan to update this page from time to time. For starters, these notes are not in any particular order. As time permits, I will put them in order. Mostly, for now, it’s simply defining terms and showing implication of terms.


For traditional Christiaity, will (subsumed under “operations”), essence, and hypostasis are distinct. If the one will of Christ were hypostatic and not natural, then there are three wills in the Trinity. If the one will of Christ were natural, as monophysites maintained, then it was some sort of “christic” will (see Perry’s post on this) and being neither divine nor human, doesn’t save.

Dyotheletism, or two wills in Christ, can maintain a one united divine will of the Trinity, plus a natural human will. Implication is that “will” is natural to what it is to be human. This is the classical Christian position.

However, must what is natural be compelled? Originally, no, though this question needs more out-fleshing. If what is natural is compelled, and God is by nature God, and who is by nature Creator, must also of necessity be a creator. This, of course, is the heresy of Origenism. Therefore, what is natural is not necessarily compelled.