“Being implies movement, but gives to that movement an opposite direction; movement does not consist in a fall, as in Origen, but of a movement upward toward God” (133-134).
Man’s will: possesses a natural will, and that will is a freedom of nature in conformity with divine freedom and unable to lead to anything but the Good (137).
“For Maximus, and for the monastic tradition he represented on that point…the enjoyment of the senses is now more or less identified with the idea of sexual pleasure, and as such expresses what is corrupted in human nature from the moment of sin” (142).
Logos-tropos distinction: every being posseses in himself a natural law but concretely exists only according to a mode of existence (145).
Gnomic will: gnome reflects hypostasis or will, but Maximus is not saying that will is hypostatic. It is the free will of created hypostases. It is on a level with movement. The point he wants to make is that sin is a personal action, not a natural one. Christ did not possess a gnomic will (which raises the question, is he really consubstantial with our humanity?).
Alarmingly, Maximus writes, “Our salvation depends on our will” (149, Liber Asceticus, col. 953b). “Spiritual life…supposes the transformation of our gnomic will into a ‘divine and angelic gnome'” (149). Maximus goes on to say that union with God is natural to man, meaning that our nature points to it.
It’s a beautiful metaphysics, maybe the most beautiful. While he did cut Origenism off at the knees, the spectre of Neo-Platonism and Ps. Dionysius haunts the realm. We hear absolutely nothing of the gospel proclamation extra nos. Meyendorff is quick to assure us that Maximus is no Pelagian. Fair enough (though see comments by Oliver O’Donovan, Resurrection and Moral Order, 17), but is he a semi-Pelagian?